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Steven L. Chanenson
Write On!
Pity the poor appellate judge. All alone, she sits in her chambers with just 
her clerks, law books, and the cold, bleak trial record for company. No 
witness’s testimony to hear. No defendant’s demeanor to observe. How is she 
supposed to determine what is — or is not — a reasonable sentence?  How can 
she ascertain whether the sentencing judge honored the command of the 
remedial majority in United States v. Booker and “consider[ed]”1 the myriad of 
potentially conflicting goals established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(“SRA”) as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)?  The appellate judge knows that a 
sentence that simply hides in the comfortable shadows of the now “effectively 
advisory”2 Guidelines cannot be reasonable per se. After searching the Booker tea 
leaves for the thousandth time, she also suspects that her colleagues’ growing 
acceptance of a presumption of reasonableness for Guideline-compliant 
sentences is mistaken — perhaps evens a dodge. So she looks for what 
Professor Douglas Berman calls “independent reasoned judgment.”3 But how 
can she find it?
The answer to this puzzle — which should have been central to pre-Booker
sentencing and is essential to post-Booker sentencing — rests in the mind of the 
District Judge. The trial judge who does not share his judgment and reasoning 
has done little for the appellate judge, the Sentencing Commission or the cause 
of just sentencing. Thus, the sentencing judge must explain his reasons, and 
meaningfully document how he grappled with the § 3553(a) factors to reach the 
sentence imposed. This means writing sentencing opinions.
Despite an arguable tension with the Booker merits majority, the SRA—in a 
section entitled “Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence”—requires 
1. 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (remedial majority).
2. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (remedial majority).
3. Douglas A. Berman, Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART (2006), 
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/berman/html.
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sentencing judges who choose to vary from the now-advisory Guideline range 
to describe why in open court and commit those reasons to paper “with 
specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment.”4 One might 
think that this provision would result in a veritable flood of well-reasoned 
sentencing opinions. But one would be wrong.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (“AO”) has created an anemic 
form ostensibly in an effort to comply with this requirement in the wake of 
Booker. Ironically described as a “Statement of Reasons,” this document 
contains a parade of nearly meaningless check boxes that mirror the broad § 
3553(a) factors. While it does provide space for a factual justification, the form 
almost seems designed to encourage the kind of mechanical—and arguably 
unreasoned—approach to sentencing Booker tried to extinguish. This is thin 
gruel, indeed, for our unfortunate appellate judge. Compounding the injury, 
the AO prevents the public from seeing these insipid documents, just as it 
refuses to release all judge-specific information about sentences. By limiting 
judicial transparency, the AO’s deeply misguided resorts to secrecy only further 
the distrust and disdain that the other branches of government and, sadly, the 
public increasingly direct toward the judiciary.
Improving the quality and availability of all sentencing information—
including sentencing opinions and judge-specific sentencing data—can yield 
numerous benefits. For example, if the court of appeals has the statistics 
demonstrating how the various district courts in its circuit exercise their 
sentencing discretion, it will be better able to give life to the concept of 
“reasonableness” review. Complete contextual information coupled with a 
meaningful written explanation will allow the appellate courts to put the 
sentence into the proper perspective. As Professor Marc Miller argued more 
than fifteen years ago, at the dawn of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, “Full 
written opinions, rather than transcripts or sentencing ‘forms,’ may provide 
the best source of commentary on the sentencing rules selected by a 
commission, and offer the best hope for further refinement, revision, and 
reform.”5
Written opinions help to communicate vital sentencing knowledge not only 
to the appellate courts but to Congress, the Commission, and the public as 
well. In fact, Congress and the public might have a better understanding of and 
respect for the judicial role if they were able to read an opinion describing why
a judge imposed a sentence that—at  an uninformed distance—might otherwise 
seem inappropriate. This increased understanding might even reduce the level 
of congressional frustration with judges that has contributed to the 
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2000).
5. Marc L. Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3, 4 (1989).
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proliferation of so many unwise and counterproductive mandatory sentencing 
laws. Regardless, well-reasoned sentencing opinions and judicial transparency 
concerning sentencing are two of the best weapons judges have to bolster their 
legitimacy and preserve their decisional independence.
Despite the AO’s bureaucratic myopia, there is cause for some sentencing 
opinion optimism. First, a number of appellate panels have enforced the 
statutory reasons requirement and reversed in cases in which the judge failed to 
provide a sufficient explanation of the logic behind the sentence. More 
importantly, several district judges understand the importance of sentencing 
opinions—both for appellate review of the sentences they impose and for the 
proper operation of the sentencing system as a whole. Judges across the 
ideological spectrum, including, for example, Judges Lynn Adelman (E.D. 
Wisc.),6 Peter Bataillon (D. Neb.),7 Paul Cassell (D. Utah),8 Nancy Gertner 
(D. Mass.),9 Richard Kopf (D. Neb.),10 and Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.),11
have all taken their responsibility to document their reasoned sentencing 
judgment seriously. Shortly after Booker, Judge Gertner hit the nail on the head 
when she observed that “an ‘advisory’ regime makes it all the more important 
that I adhere to my practice of writing opinions, outlining the reasons for the 
sentences I have imposed.”12
Sentencing opinions are helpful whether or not the judge varies from the 
advisory Guidelines. These opinions need not always be lengthy and their 
analytical depth can vary with the circumstances. The key is to provide a 
window into the discretionary sentencing process and to afford appellate courts 
something substantive to review.
Armed with adequate information from the sentencing judge, the appellate 
court will itself look to § 3553(a) because those factors “will guide appellate 
courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is 
unreasonable.”13 In practice, reasonableness review is likely to mean that there 
is “more than one right answer.”14 Meaningful sentencing opinions—at both 
the trial and appellate levels—will help us understand why those multiple 
answers are right.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (D. Neb. 2005).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2005).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Neb. 2005).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
12. United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 367 (D. Mass. 2005).
13. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (remedial majority).
14. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 194 (1996).
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Modern federal appellate review of sentences is a recent phenomenon 
introduced by the SRA. Before Booker, courts of appeal focused on enforcing 
the technical rules of the Guidelines and did so with (over)zealous enthusiasm. 
Perhaps they can bring that same passion to reasonableness review and usher 
in a “common-law-like”15 revolution in sentencing. Remember our poor 
appellate judge?  She and many of her colleagues are trying to bring order to 
our new sentencing world, but the reviewing courts cannot do it alone. They 
need help. They need more than just the bottom line of how many years the 
defendant will serve. They need to know how and why the district court got to 
that bottom line. They need meaningful sentencing opinions. District Judges, 
start your keyboards!
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